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Abstract: The paper investigates interpretations of propositional and first-
order logic in which validity is defined in terms of partial indices; some-
times called possibilities but here understood as non-empty subsets of a
set W of possible worlds. Truth at a set of worlds is understood to be
truth at every world in the set. If all subsets of W are permitted the
logic so determined is classical first-order predicate logic. Restricting al-
lowable subsets and then imposing certain closure conditions provides
a modelling for intuitionistic predicate logic. The same semantic inter-
pretation rules are used in both logics for all the operators.
In standard modellings of intuitionistic logic, disjunction (∨) is usually under-
stood as classical, while negation (∼ or ¬) is understood non-classically. In this
paper I present a semantics for intuitionistic logic according to which it is
disjunction, rather than negation, which is not classical. I call it ‘possibility
semantics’, following Humberstone 1981 and Chapter 8 of Cresswell 1990, be-
cause it treats the indices at which formulae are evaluated for truth and falsity
as ‘partial’ or ‘incomplete’ indices. One way of understanding an incomplete
index is in the sense of a proposition, where a proposition is thought of as
a class of possible worlds. In looking at intuitionistic logic from a classical
perspective it is natural to follow the Kripke modelling and interpret intuition-
istic negation ¬ as something like 2∼, where 2 is the necessity operator and ∼
is classical negation, together with a restriction on the value assignments to the
propositional variables. I shew how to give a unified semantics for both ∼ and
∨ which gives classical or intuitionistic logic according to different restrictions
placed on the ‘allowable’ indices. The philosophical importance of this is that
you can then exhibit the difference between the two logics not as a matter of
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what you choose to mean by ‘not’ or any other operator, but as a matter of how
the world presents itself for evaluation in terms of truth.1
So assume a set W of possible worlds and assume a value assignment V
which assigns to every variable in a standard propositional language a set of
possible worlds. Assume that the language contains ∼, ∧, ⊃ and ∨. Where w
is a possible world we may define truth at w in the obvious way, where  is the
‘truth predicate’ which depends on V :
w p iff w ∈ V(p).
w ∼α iff

w α (where ‘
’ means ‘not ’).
w α∧ β iff both w α and w β.
w α ⊃ β iff either w α or w β.
w α∨ β iff either w α or w β.
Call a wff valid iff it is true at every index in every assignment. The class of
valid wff is of course just the classical propositional calculus. What then about
truth at a proposition? Assume the (classical) ‘adequacy requirement’ that a wff
is true at a (non-empty) set a of worlds iff it is true at every w ∈ a. ‘α is true
at a’ can be written as a α and the requirement can be stated as:
[A] a α iff w α for all w ∈ a.
For propositions of the form {w}, i. e propositions consisting of a single world,
the rules given above can be stated with {w} in place of w. It is a con-
sequence of requirement [A] that negation at a set of worlds does not satisfy
the standard truth table. For suppose a = {w1, w2}, and V(p) = {w1}. Then,
by [A], a p, since w2 ∈ a and w2 p, and

a ∼p since w1 ∈ a and w1 ∼p.
But despite this [A] gives us a completely classical logic in the sense that all
classically valid wff of this language will be true at every possible world and so
true at every set of worlds.2
I shall now investigate what happens if in place of the truth rules given in
terms of possible worlds and then applied to truth at propositions via require-
ment [A] we try to define directly truth at a proposition. Say that 〈W,V〉 is a
tractarian3 model iffW is a set (of ‘worlds’) and for every propositional variable
1There are of course many discussions of the semantics of intuitionistic logic, and I am able
to do no more than allude in passing to some of them. For instance, comments on an earlier
version of this paper suggested that its results were well known as the ‘Beth-Kripke-Joyal se-
mantics’, as reported in theorem 4.39 on p. 156 of Bell 1988 or in Theorem 8.4 on p. 166 of Lam-
bek and Scott 1986. It is true that the Beth-Kripke-Joyal semantics depends on a non-standard
semantics for ∨ which gives classical logic in standard set theory, and gives intuitionistic lo-
gic under other conditions. However, I shew below that while there may be some connection
between the Beth-Kripke-Joyal semantics and the results obtained here it does not seem to be
a direct connection. (I am grateful to Lloyd Humberstone for encouraging me not to lie down
and play dead when I was accused of re-inventing the wheel!)
2A principle like [A] in the context of tense logic with indices as intervals is mentioned on
p. 42 of van Benthem 1985.
3I use the word ‘tractarian’ to acknowledge the influence ofWittgenstein 1921 on at least one
way of understanding incomplete indices. I discuss this at the end of the paper.
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p, V(p) ⊆ W.4 (V(p) may be empty.) Where ∅ 6= a ⊆ W we define the truth
of a wff α at a, written a α, as follows. For atomic wff we have
[p] a p iff a ⊆ V(p).
(In strictness I should write V a α to indicate the dependence of  on V , but
throughout the paper I shall suppress this where it is obvious which model is
involved.) The rule for conjunction poses no problems:
[∧] a α∧ β iff a α and a β.
For ∼, requirement [A] would make ∼p true at a iff p is false at everyw ∈ a. In
terms of propositions this can be stated as
[∼] a ∼α iff b α for every ∅ 6= b ⊆ a.
Say that an operator O is (classically) respectable iff, provided α1,. . . ,αn satisfy
[A] thenOα1 . . . αn satisfies [A]. It is an obvious consequence of this definition
that if all atomic wff satisfy [p] and all the operators are respectable then all
wff satisfy [A]. Further, if all operators are truth-functional at worlds, then
the class of wff true at every index in every interpretation is just the classical
propositional calculus. Validity of course now means truth at every non-empty
set of worlds in every tractarian frame. If [A] is in force then [∼] emerges as
a completely classical account of negation for the following reason: Suppose
a ∼α. Then

b α for all b ⊆ a. In particular, if w ∈ a then {w} ⊆ a and
so w α and so w ∼α for all w ∈ a. Suppose a ∼α. Then for some b ⊆ a,
b α. But if α satisfies [A] then for anyw ∈ b, w α and so w ∼α. Butw ∈ b
and b ⊆ a, and so for some w ∈ a, w ∼α.
The rule for implication is
[⊃] a α ⊃ β iff for every b ⊆ a either b α or b β.
It is a consequence of [⊃] that ⊃ is respectable. If a α ⊃ β and w ∈ a then,
by [⊃], w α or w β and so w α ⊃ β. Conversely, suppose a α ⊃ β. Then,
by [⊃], for some b ⊆ a, b α and b β. So there is somew ∈ b such that w β.
4I have stated things on the assumption that a ‘propositional’ index a is a set of worlds. That
is why I have chosen to use the word ‘proposition’ rather than Humberstone’s word ‘possib-
ility’. While my formulation of [A] requires the assumption of sets of worlds the case can be
described without that assumption. It is important to do so since those who want to use ‘incom-
plete’ indices in this way often object to construing them as sets of complete indices. Following
Humberstone 1981 call a ′ a refinement of a, if a ′ gives all the information that a gives, and per-
haps more besides. If a is a set of worlds, as I have been assuming in the text, then refinement
is simply class inclusion. Humberstone 1981, p. 318, has a condition he calls refinability, that if
neither α nor ∼α is true at an index then there are two refinements of that index with α true at
one refinement and ∼α true at the other. Humberstone is concerned to obtain classical logic as
the logic of possibilities, though Humberstone takes possibilities as primitive. I am particularly
grateful to Lloyd Humberstone for extremely detailed and helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this paper.
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But w ∈ b and b α, so w α. So, for some w ∈ b, w α ⊃ β. But b ⊆ a and
so for some w ∈ a, w α ⊃ β. [⊃] in conjunction with a ‘falsum’ constant, ⊥,
true at no world, will ensure that α ⊃ ⊥ is equivalent to ∼α according to [∼].
Despite the fact that these operators have been described as leading to clas-
sical logic the semantics just presented has a close connection with intuition-
istic logic.5 The standard Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic is based on
frames of the form 〈I, R〉 where I is a set of indices and R a reflexive and transit-
ive relation on the indices. A model 〈I, R, V〉 places on V the condition that if
a propositional variable p is true at an index i and iRj then p is true at j. I have
referred to an index i rather than to a world, since ‘index’ is a neutral term. In
a tractarian frame the indices are non-empty sets of worlds, but in the Kripke
semantics nothing is said about what they might be. If you treat an index as a
set of worlds— as what I have called a proposition — then you can say that aRb
iff b ⊆ a. So any tractarian rule in which the conditions are stated using only
⊆ has an analogue in a Kripke model for intuitionistic logic. In particular, the
Kripke rules for ∧, ∼ and ⊃ are the same as those given for tractarian models
except that I write V(α, i) = 1 instead of a α and V(α, i) = 0 instead of

a α. Specifically they are these:
V(α∧ β, i) = 1 if V(α, i) = 1 and V(β, i) = 1, and 0 otherwise.
V(∼α, i) = 1 if V(α, j) = 0 for every j where iRj and 0 otherwise.
V(α ⊃ β, i) = 1 if, for every j where iRj, either V(α, j) = 0
or V(β, j) = 1, and 0 otherwise.
In such a semantics one might regard the frame as setting the structure of
logical space, while the valuation rules determine the meaning of the operators
within that space. There is a trade-off here. A paper such as Došen 1991 shews
that the reflexive and transitive properties of R can be omitted if we impose
restrictions on the truth sets of wff (i. e. the sets of indices at which a given
wff is true.) By contrast, the aim of the present paper is to shew that by taking
the indices as sets of worlds and by adopting a non-standard semantics for ∨,
you can get either classical or intuitionistic logic according to which sets you
admit as indices. Notice though — and this will be important enough for me
to repeat from time to time — that restricting which sets of worlds count as
allowable indices is quite different from specifying which sets of indices count
as allowable truth sets. A procedure closer in spirit to the present paper, but
using Kripke frames, would be one which simply restricts Kripke frames to one-
world reflexive frames in order to get classical logic. Such a restriction is stated
purely at the frame level. There is even a philosophical motivation for it in that
a classical logician might be one who assumes that truth and falsity is a once-
and-for-all matter, while an intuitionist sees it as a developing matter. However,
5In my discussion of intuitionistic logic I am relying primarily on van Dalen 1986, pp. 246–
252. The paper is of course in the tradition of giving a ‘classical’ account of intuitionistic logic,
but, unlike many other attempts to do this, it does not interpret intuitionistic logic by giving a
meaning for ¬ and→ different from the ‘classical’ meaning given to ∼ and ⊃.
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one-world frames do not admit an explanation of the necessity of classical logic,
and some classical logicians may therefore want more.
From the usual point of view intuitionistic negation and implication, fre-
quently written ¬ and→, are considered non-classical. By contrast disjunction
in the Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic is considered classical, since ∨
has the rule that V(α ∨ β, i) = 1 iff V(α, i) = 1 or V(β, i) = 1. The corres-
ponding tractarian rule would be:
[∨] a α∨ β iff either a α or a β.
But it is easy to see that when the indices are non-empty sets of worlds and [A]
is in force then it is [∨] rather than [∼] or [⊃]which is not classically respectable.
For let a = {w1, w2} and let V(p) = {w1} and V(q) = {w2}. Then {w1} p
and so {w1} p∨ q and {w2} q and so {w2} p∨ q. So by [A], a p∨ q. But

{w2} p and {w2} ⊆ a and so

a p and

{w1} q and {w1} ⊆ a and so

a q. So,
by [∨] we have the contradictory result that a p∨ q.6
The following rule gives a semantics for ∨ which is classically respectable:
[∨∪] a α ∨ β iff there are some b and c such that a ⊆ b ∪ c and b α or
b β, and c α or c β.7
6Note that [∨] gives the same result as the rule that a α ∨ β iff either b α or b β for
all b ⊆ a. There is an alternative semantics for ∨ due to E. W. Beth. (See van Dalen 1986,
pp. 246–252.) Say that a path is a set C of indices such that for any a, b ∈ C either a ⊆ b or
b ⊆ a, and if C ⊆ C ′ and for any a, b ∈ C ′ either a ⊆ b or b ⊆ a , then C = C ′. Then say that
B is a bar for a iff B ⊆ ℘W and for any path C such that a ∈ C there is some b ∈ C such that
b ∈ B. What this means is that every path through a goes through B.
[∨Beth] a α∨ β iff there is some B which is a bar for a, and for all b ∈ B, either b α or b β.
From an intuitionistic point of view the idea is that however the future develops at least one
of α or β will eventually be true. In some futures it might be α and in others β, but in all of
them one at least will be true. But the Beth semantics fares no better than [∨] from our point of
view, since it is not hard to see that [∨Beth] is not respectable. Let the indices be sets of worlds
where we may take the ‘worlds’ to be natural numbers. WhereW is the set of natural numbers
let a0 = W and for n > 0 let an = an−1 − {n}. Let C = {an : n > 0}. Obviously if n 6 m
then am ⊆ an. C is clearly a path, and further, it is a maximal path, for suppose there is some
chain C ′ such that C ⊆ C ′ but C ′ 6= C. Let b ∈ C ′ but b 6∈ C. Then either (i) for some n > 0,
an ⊆ b ⊆ an−1 and b 6= an and b 6= an−1 or (ii) b ⊆ an for every n > 0. If (i) then there is
some k such that k 6∈ an and k ∈ b, and some j 6∈ b and j ∈ an−1. So k ∈ an and k 6∈ an−1 and
j ∈ an and j 6∈ an−1. But in that case k = n = j, which contradicts the assumption that k ∈ b
and j 6∈ b. Suppose b ⊆ an for every n > 0. Since b 6= ∅ suppose h ∈ b. But h 6∈ ah. Now let
V(p) = {n : n is even}. Then a p for all a ∈ C and a ∼p for all a ∈ C, and so there is no bar
B for a0 such that b p or b ∼p for all b ∈ B. So, by [∨Beth], a0 p∨ ∼p; and therefore [∨Beth]
is not respectable.
7Another rule might seem to be:
[∨ ′] a α∨ β iff for all b ⊆ a there is some c ⊆ b such that c α or c β.
See p. 322 of Humberstone 1981 and p. 238 of van Benthem 1986 for an equivalent condition.
However, [∨ ′] is simply what you get when you define α ∨ β as ∼(∼α ∧ ∼β), and will not
therefore provide a semantics for the full intuitionistic logic, since, as is well known, the set of
intuitionistically valid wff in ∼ and ∧ is the same as those valid in classical logic. (See Gödel,
1933, p. 34.)
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T 1 If ∨ satisfies [∨∪] then ∨ is classically respectable.
P Suppose a α∨ β. Then there are some b and c such that a ⊆ b ∪ c
and b α or b β, and c α or c β. Suppose w ∈ a. Then w ∈ b ∪ c and
so w ∈ b or w ∈ c. If w ∈ b then w α or w β and so w α ∨ β. Likewise
if w ∈ c. Now suppose that, for all w ∈ a, w α ∨ β. First if w α for all
w ∈ a then w β for all w ∈ a, and so a β, and so a α ∨ β. (And mutatis
mutandis if w β for all w ∈ a.) Otherwise let b = {w ∈ W : w α} and
c = {w ∈ W : w β}. Then a ⊆ b ∪ c and b α and c β, and so, by [∨∪],
a α∨ β. ]
One way to distinguish between classical and intuitionistic logic might there-
fore be by choosing which of [∨] or [∨∪] to use. But using different interpreta-
tion rules seems an admission that ∨ has different meanings, and in fact would
permit a logic with two symbols, one governed by [∨] and one governed by
[∨∪].8 It is an assumption of the present paper that the operators should obey
the same rules in both logics, but that the differences should emerge by consid-
ering the nature of the indices. Since [A] demands respectable operators I shall
assume that the semantic rule for ∨ is [∨∪] and shall examine what must be
done to obtain intuitionistic logic using [∨∪]. But first we need an important
theorem:
T 2 If a α and b ⊆ a then b α.
P The proof is by induction on the construction of wff. The theorem is
defined to hold for atomic wff, and the rules for ∼, ∧, ⊃ and ∨ (whether [∨] or
[∨∪] is used) ensure that it holds for all wff. ]
The analogue of Theorem 2 holds in all Kripke models for intuitionistic logic.
As a consequence, if iRj and jRi then for all α, V(α, i) = V(α, j), and so every
equivalence class of indices may be reduced to one with just a single member.
Thus any intuitionistic frame is equivalent to one in which R is antisymmet-
rical.
The proofs that the operators defined by these conditions are respectable
of course depend on the fact that the system of indices is a complete Boolean
algebra, and Kripke frames for intuitionistic logic merely require that the ac-
cessibility relation be reflexive and transitive. In particular I have made essen-
tial use of sets of the form {w} which have the property that {w} ∼γ iff {w} γ
for any wff γ. Put in terms of indices in Kripke frames this requires that for
any i there be some j such that iRj and V(∼γ, j) = 1 iff V(γ, j) = 0 for any
wff γ. So, in the first place every index i can see an endpoint j where if jRk
8Schulz 1993 p. 176, in the context of situation theory, has two disjunction operators, one,
written as ∪, behaves like [∨], i. e. ‘classically’, while the other is equivalent to ∼(∼α ∧ ∼β). On
p. 184 Schulz appears to reject a condition which would state that if α∨∼α fails at an incomplete
index a (Schulz has failing at an infon σ) then there are indices b and c such that b ⊆ a and
c ⊆ a and α is true at a and ∼α is true at c. He calls this condition ‘complete splitting’, and
claims it would trivialize the theory. This would seem to be a rejection of some such rule as
[∨∪].
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then j = k. In the second place the tractarian semantics would require models
which satisfy the following endpoint property:
[EP] If V(α, j) = 1 for every endpoint j such that iRj then V(α, i) = 1.9
If all propositional variables satisfy [EP] and all operators behave classically on
worlds and are respectable, then the logic so determined is classical . Now
consider the following (Kripke) frame, which I shall call F1:
I = {i, j} and R = {〈i, i〉, 〈i, j〉, 〈j, j〉}.
In F1, R is a partial ordering, and so the frame is a (Kripke) frame for intuition-
istic logic. This frame will falsify ∼∼p ⊃ p by making p true at j but false at i.
From the latter V(p, i) = 0 and from the former V(∼p, i) = 0 and V(∼p, j) = 0,
and so V(∼∼p, i) = 1. However, although every world in this frame can see an
endpoint this model does not satisfy [EP].10 Actually F1 is not a possible trac-
tarian frame, since in a tractarian frame an endpoint, here j, is {w} for some
world w. i cannot be an endpoint since i 6= j. So there is some w ′ 6= w with
{w,w ′} ⊆ i. But then {w ′} ⊆ i and since j 6= {w ′} there must be some endpoint
k such that iRk and k 6= j. Thus we get the following frame F2:
I = {i, j, k} and R = {〈i, i〉, 〈i, j〉, 〈i, k〉, 〈j, j〉, 〈k, k〉}
i. e i can see itself and the two endpoints j and k. In terms of a frame with
tractarian indices the worlds would be w1 and w2, and the indices would be
a = {w1, w2}, b = {w1} and c = {w2}. But suppose we disallow c as a possible
index. The rationale might be this. In understanding the meaning of a wff α
we need to know its truth conditions—we need to know whether it is true at
this or that index. Suppose that c is an index to which we have no epistemic
access. F1 could be thought of as the ‘conscious’ part of reality. Although
c is not present to consciousness, and therefore is not an index in F1, yet it
covers a part of reality which has effects that are so present. Putting V(p) =
{w1}, and therefore making p false at w2, is enough to stop p being true at
a despite the fact that c is not an allowable index, since the falsity of p at w2
is discerned at a, which is an allowable index. (This is because a 6⊆ V(p).)
Thus an intuitionistic frame can be embedded in a tractarian frame by allowing
9There is a related property which van Benthem 1986 p. 238, calls stability:
[S] If for all k such that iRk there is some j where kRj and V(α, j) = 1 then V(α, i) = 1.
Where every index can see an endpoint [EP] and [S] are equivalent. For wff of the form ∼α [S]
always holds, for suppose iRk. Then if there is some j such that kRj and V(∼α, j) = 1 then, for
every h such that jRh, V(α, h) = 0. But kRh, and so, by Theorem 2, V(α, k) = 0. If this is so
for every k such that iRk then V(∼α, i) = 1, satisfying [S].
10In tractarian models, and in all Kripke models which satisfy [EP], α ⊃ β may be defined as
∼(α∧∼β). But without [EP] this will not work for Kripke models in general. Take the following
model based on F1: V(p, i) = V(p, j) = V(q, j) = 1, V(q, i) = 0. Since iRi then V(p ⊃ q, i) = 0.
But V(q, j) = 1, and so V(p∧ ∼q, j) = 0 and V(p∧ ∼q, i) = 0. So V(∼(p∧ ∼q), i) = 1.
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only certain sets of worlds.11 Using this technique we can give a precise sense
in which intuitionistic logic is just what you get from the logic of tractarian
indices if you place restrictions on which sets of worlds are indices.
Say that a general tractarian frame is a pair 〈W,P〉 in which W is a set (of
‘worlds’) and P is any non-empty set of non-empty subsets ofW; i. e. ∅ 6= P ⊆
℘W−∅. P is the set of ‘allowable’ sets of worlds. 〈W,P〉may look like a general
frame in modal logic (see Hughes and Cresswell 1996, p. 167), but note that P
is not required to satisfy the closure conditions which constrain such general
frames. Further the closure conditions apply to indices not to truth sets. The
philosophical importance of this is that a restriction on indices is a restriction
on how truth is presented, and in a sense is non-linguistic. Restricting truth
sets on the other hand may be thought of as a restriction on language. 〈W,P, V〉
is a model based on 〈W,P〉 iff V(p) ⊆ W for every variable p. [p], [∧], [∼] and
[⊃] are as before except that the indices, a, b etc., are restricted to members
of P—i. e. to the allowable sets of worlds. For [∨∪] all of a, b, c and b∪ cmust
be in P, so that [∨∪] reads
[∨∪] a α∨ β iff there are some b and c such that a, b, c and b ∪ c ∈ P, and
a ⊆ b ∪ c and b α or b β, and c α or c β.
Where P = ℘W−∅, 〈W,P〉 is called a full tractarian frame, andmodels based on
full frames are equivalent to tractarian models as earlier defined. Full tractarian
frames with [∨∪] give you classical logic. The logic of general tractarian frames
contains intuitionistic logic if [∨] is used, since⊆ is reflexive and transitive, and
the evaluation rules are exact analogues of those used in the Kripke semantics.
However, full frames with [∨] are not respectable. If [∨∪] is used, the following
model will falsify one of the theorems of intuitionistic logic:12
((p ⊃ r)∧ (q ⊃ r)) ⊃ ((p∨ q) ⊃ r)
LetW = {1, 2, 3}, a = {2, 3}, b = {1, 2}, c = {1, 3}, P = {a, b, c, b∪c}, V(p) = b,
V(q) = c, V(r) = ∅. In this model a ⊆ b ∪ c, and b p and c q. So a p∨ q.
But since a r, then

a (p∨q) ⊃ r. Now if d ⊆ a and d ∈ P, then d = a, and
11In the present example even on F2 it is straightforward to falsify ∼∼p ⊃ p by making p false
at i and true at j and k. In a tractarian frame this would have to be because there are yet more
disallowed endpoints, at which p is false.
12The following set of axioms for intuitionistic logic comes from Heyting 1930:
1 p ⊃ (p ∧ p), 2 (p ∧ q) ⊃ (q ∧ p), 3 (p ⊃ q) ⊃ ((p ∧ r) ⊃ (q ∧ r)),
4 ((p ⊃ q) ∧ (q ⊃ r)) ⊃ (p ⊃ r), 5 p ⊃ (q ⊃ p), 6 (p ∧ (p ⊃ q)) ⊃ q,
7 p ⊃ (p∨ q), 8 (p∨ q) ⊃ (q∨ p), 9 ((p ⊃ r)∧ (q ⊃ r)) ⊃ ((p∨ q) ⊃ r),
10 ∼p ⊃ (p ⊃ q), 11 ((p ⊃ q)∧ (p ⊃ ∼q)) ⊃ ∼p.
(As I mentioned before I use the ‘classical’ symbols ∼ and⊃ in place of ¬ and→.) In the general
tractarian semantics using [∨∪] all the axioms except 9 will still be valid even if [∨∪] is used.
All but 7, 8 and 9 lack ∨. 7 only requires the trivial consequence of [∨∪] that if a α or
a β then a α∨ β, and 8 simply relies on the fact that [∨∪] makes ∨ commutative.
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since a p and

a q then

a ((p ⊃ r)∧ (q ⊃ r)) ⊃ ((p∨ q) ⊃ r).
To get the class of wff valid in intuitionistic logic Pmust be restricted in certain
ways. Say that a general tractarian frame 〈W,P〉 is ⋃-closed iff for every C ⊆ P
such that
⋃
C ∈ P, ⋃C ∈ C.13 (In the above example if C = {b, c} then ⋃C =
b∪c ∈ P, but b∪c 6∈ C.) ⋃-closure may seem philosophically unmotivated, but
one can, I think, make at least some progress by considering some comments
made on p. 58 of Restall 1999 on the interpretation of disjunction.14 Restall
notes that the incompleteness of semantic indices causes a problem for the
‘classical’ rule for disjunction—i. e [∨]. For if a is incomplete there seems no
reason why it should not provide the information that α ∨ β is true without
either providing the information that α is true, or the information that β is
true. Restall’s answer is that indices are ‘maximally specific about their subject
matter’. So it might help to look at a simple illustration which I have used
in a number of places.15 The idea is that ‘information’ is given by a set B of
‘basic particular situations’, as it might be by which points of spacetime are
occupied and which are not. ‘Spacetime’ here may be thought of as some kind
of ‘logical space’ or a physical space, though perhaps it is better to think of it
as a simplification of a reality which is much more complex. The set B of all
such situations is the set of all pairs of the form 〈pi, 1〉 or 〈pi, 0〉 where pi is a
spacetime point. 〈pi, 1〉 would represent that pi is occupied, and 〈pi, 0〉 that it is
not. More generally, where Π is any set, the situations structure B, strictly BΠ,
based on Π, will be the set of all pairs of the form 〈pi, 1〉 or 〈pi, 0〉 for pi ∈ Π.
13A weaker condition will suffice for intuitionistic propositional logic. Say that 〈W,P〉 is ⋃∗-
closed iff where b, c and b ∪ c are all in P then either b ⊆ c or c ⊆ b. ⋃∗-closure corresponds
precisely with the equivalence of [∨] and [∨∪], since if [∨] and [∨∪] are equivalent then 〈W,P〉
is
⋃∗-closed. For suppose b, c and b ∪ c are all allowable but neither b ⊆ c nor c ⊆ b. Let
V(p) = b and V(q) = c. Then b∪c p and

b∪c q. So if [∨] is used then

b∪c p ∨ q. But
b ∪ c ⊆ b ∪ c and b p and c q, and so if [∨∪] is used b∪c p ∨ q.
⋃
-closure implies
⋃∗-
closure. I. e., if 〈W,P〉 is ⋃-closed and a, b and a ∪ b ∈ P then either a ⊆ b or b ⊆ a, since,
given that 〈W,P〉 is ⋃-closed let C = {a, b}. Now a ∪ b ∈ P and so a ∪ b ∈ C. So a ∪ b = a
or a ∪ b = b. So a ⊆ b or b ⊆ a. But ⋃-closure is stronger than ⋃∗-closure in the sense that
there is a tractarian frame 〈W,P〉 which is ⋃∗-closed but not ⋃-closed. For let W = {1, 2, 3}
and let P = {{1}, {2}, {3},W}. Then, where C = {{1}, {2}, {3}},
⋃
C ∈ P but ⋃C 6∈ C. So 〈W,P〉 is
not
⋃
-closed. But if a ∪ b ∈ P then a = b or a = W or b = W. Either way a ⊆ b or b ⊆ a.
(Note that it is crucial that none of {1, 2}, {1, 3} or {2, 3} is in P.) So 〈W,P〉 is ⋃∗-closed but not⋃
-closed.
14Restall is also concerned to allow inconsistent indices, where both α and ∼α might be true,
and thus provide a motivation for paraconsistent and relevance logics. A criticism of the in-
terpretation of ∨ in relevance logic occurs as early as Copeland 1979, pp. 404–406. Devlin
1990 justifies the classical rule for disjunction on p. 90, by saying disjunctive information ‘is
already one step removed from the way the world is’. On p. 86 he says that while ‘the in-
formation content of the single infon 〈〈parent-of, x, y〉〉 is the same as that of the disjunction
〈〈father-of, x, y〉〉∨ 〈〈mother-of, x, y〉〉, ‘only the former has infon status’.
15The idea is found inWittgenstein 1921. I first explored a version of it in Cresswell 1972, and
followed it up in various ways in Cresswell 1973, 1990 and 1994.
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A situation16 s is a subset of B and will be called consistent if at most one of
〈pi, 1〉 and 〈pi, 0〉 is in s. Let Con be the set of all consistent situations. Say that
any set a of situations is allowables iff there is some s ∈ Con, call it sa, such that
a = {s ∈ Con : sa ⊆ s}, and let 〈Con, PB〉 be the general tractarian frame in
which PB is the set of all allowables sets of situations. Intuitively the allowable
sets of situations are those which convey precise and full information about a
part of the world, that is, those that describe precisely the occupation pattern
of some region of space. Such sets are partial since they need speak of only a
part of space, but about that region of space they give complete information.
T 3 〈Con, PB〉 is
⋃
-closed.
P (i) (∀s ∈ Con)(s ∈ ⋃C ≡ (∃a ∈ C)s ∈ a).
Suppose C ⊆ PB and
⋃
C ∈ PB. Since
⋃
C ∈ PB there is some s∗ ∈ Con such
that
⋃
C = {s ∈ Con : s∗ ⊆ s}, and since C ⊆ PB, if a ∈ C, a = {s ∈ Con :
sa ⊆ s}. So from (i)
(ii) (∀s ∈ Con)(s∗ ⊆ s ≡ (∃a ∈ C)sa ⊆ s).
and so
s∗ ⊆ s∗ ≡ (∃a ∈ C)sa ⊆ s∗.
So for some a ∈ C,
(iii) sa ⊆ s∗.
But also from (ii), (∀s ∈ Con)((∃a ∈ C)sa ⊆ s ⊃ s∗ ⊆ s). So (∀s ∈ Con)(∀a ∈
C)(sa ⊆ s ⊃ s∗ ⊆ s), and so
(∀a ∈ C)(sa ⊆ sa ⊃ s∗ ⊆ sa).
So s∗ ⊆ sa for every a ∈ C, and so, from (iii) s∗ = sa for some a ∈ C, and so
a =
⋃
C for some a ∈ C, and so ⋃C ∈ C. ]
16The use of ‘situations’ has been extensively developed in the ‘situation semantics’ deriving
from the work of Jon Barwise and John Perry, and may well have some links with the ideas of
the present paper. The principal source for situation semantics is Barwise and Perry 1983. On
p. 54, they impose a number of conditions on situations to make them what they call coherent.
The conditions include consistency in the sense of the present paper. A more recent survey of
work in this tradition is given in Seligman and Moss, 1997. Barwise and Etchemendy, 1990, note
that ‘infon algebras’ are Heyting algebras, and make brief mention of disjunction on p. 50f. The
connection between partiality and intuitionistic logic is discussed on p. 44f of van Benthem
1985. On p. 45 van Benthem notes that the interpretation of ∨ in intuitionistic logic may be
troublesome in a partial setting. (See also van Benthem 1986, pp. 236–239.) My interpretation of
indices as sets of worlds betrays a classical bias, and would almost certainly be rejected by most
situation theorists.
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Theorem 3 might be thought to suggest that the intuitions behind situation
semantics support
⋃
-closure, and therefore justify intuitionistic logic as its
correct logic. However things are not so simple. The original motivation for
this semantics was requirement [A] that a wff α is true at an index a iff α is
true at every world in a. But not all situations are worlds, and not all sets
of situations are sets of worlds. A world gives complete information about the
whole ofΠ. A situation s ∈ Con is aworld iff exactly one of 〈pi, 1〉 and 〈pi, 0〉 is in
s for every pi ∈ Π. LetWB be the set of all worlds based on B. That is,w ∈WB
iff w is a world and w ⊆ BΠ. Where s ∈ Con let as = {w ∈ WB : s ⊆ w}.
That is, as is the proposition that (set of worlds in which) s is true. Say that
any set a of worlds is allowablew iff a is as for some s ∈ Con, and let 〈WB, PB〉
be the general tractarian frame in whichWB is the set of worlds based on BΠ
and PB is the set of all allowablew sets of worlds. It turns out that Theorem 3
no longer holds. Consider the case where Π contains just two members pi1 and
pi2, and consider the following situations:
s1 = {〈pi1, 1〉, 〈pi2, 1〉},
s2 = {〈pi1, 1〉, 〈pi2, 0〉},
s3 = {〈pi1, 1〉}.
In this set of situations the worlds are s1 and s2, and PB contains {s1}, {s2} and
{s1, s2}. But whereC = {{s1}, {s2}} thenC ⊆ PB and
⋃
C (= {s1, s2}) ∈ PB but⋃
C 6∈ C. This example does not contradict Theorem 3 since, although {s1, s2}
is allowablew it is not allowables. For although {s1, s2} = {w ∈ WB : s3 ⊆ w},
{s1, s2} 6= {s ∈ Con : s3 ⊆ s}, since s3 6∈ {s1, s2}. {s1, s2, s3} is allowables but
that is not {s1} ∪ {s2}.
What this means is that while allowable sets of situations are
⋃
-closed, al-
lowable sets of worlds need not be; so that even if we agree that an index gives
all and only information about a restricted part of Π, that still does not de-
cide the question of whether
⋃
-closure should be a constraint on the logic of
partial information. To take up this question however would require an exam-
ination of situation semantics which is beyond the scope of this paper. Hope-
fully though, the paper presents a slightly different account of how restricting
indices to certain sets of worlds provides a semantics which leads to intuition-
istic logic in a way which is congenial to those who think that situation theory
as described above characterises the form in which information is presented to
us, and that we can only make sense of truth and falsity when it is presented in
this way.
The next theorem establishes that [∨] and [∨∪] give the same results if
〈W,P〉 is a ⋃-closed frame.
T 4 If 〈W,P〉 is ⋃-closed and ∨ is governed by [∨∪] then a α ∨ β
iff a α or a β.
P Suppose a α ∨ β. Then there are some b and c such that b, c and
b ∪ c ∈ P, a ⊆ b ∪ c, b α or b β, and c α or c β. Given that 〈W,P〉 is
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⋃
-closed let C = {b, c}. Now b ∪ c ∈ P and so b ∪ c ∈ C. So b ∪ c = b or
b∪c = c. So a ⊆ b or a ⊆ c. If a ⊆ b then, by Theorem 2, since b α or b β,
a α or a β, and if a ⊆ c, since c α or c β, a α or a β. So in either
case a α or a β. Now suppose a α or a β. Since a ∈ P then a ∪ a ∈ P
and a ⊆ a ∪ a, and so by [∨∪], a α∨ β. ]
A consequence of Theorem 4 is that although a tractarian frame will satisfy [A]
in respect of atomic wff, models based on
⋃
-closed frames need not satisfy [A]
in respect of complex wff. An approach which is similar to that of the present
paper is the Beth-Kripke-Joyal semantics mentioned in footnote 1. The simil-
arity arises because, as in the present approach, the indices in this semantics
appear construable as something like sets of worlds. But there are important
differences. As far as I can tell, when translated into the terminology used in
this paper, the  rule for ∨ is
[∨] a α∨ β iff there are b and c with a = b ∪ c and b α and c β.
(For a condition similar to [∨] see (*) on p. 65 of Humberstone 1988.) The
principal difference between [∨] and [∨∪] is that the condition in the former
is conjunctive; it is required that b α and c β. A less essential difference is
that the indices in the present paper are non-empty sets of worlds, and there is
no reason to suppose that both α and β are true anywhere at all. Assuming that
the other operators behave in  just as they do in the present paper then if
all sets of worlds, including the empty set, are allowed both [∨] and [∨∪]
give you classical logic. If no closure conditions at all are added to [∨] then
we can falsify (∼p∨∼p) ⊃ ∼p. (TakeW = {1, 2, 3}, a = W, b = {1, 2}, c = {1, 3}
and d = {2, 3}, with P = {a, b, c, d}. Note that for any e ∈ P, if e ⊆ b then
e = b and if e ⊆ c then e = c. With V(p) = d we have b ∼p and c ∼p,
and so by [∨], a ¬p ∨ ¬p. But

a ¬p since d ⊆ a and d p.) Adding the
closure condition of the present paper (in the form described in the note 13)
would not help, since it would validate ¬(p ∧ q) ⊃ ¬(p ∨ q). And adding any
closure condition to [∨] which yields [∨] will give the closure condition of
the present paper. For suppose a = b ∪ c and that a, b and c are all allowable.
Put V(p) = b, and V(q) = c. Then a p ∨ q. By [∨] either a p or a q.
If a p then b ∪ c ⊆ b, and if a q then b ∪ c ⊆ c; so either b ⊆ c or
c ⊆ b. If I understand the claims of the theorems of the Beth-Kripke-Joyal
semantics correctly the point appears to be that if you regard principle [A] of
the present paper not in terms of classical set theory, but in terms of a ‘local
set theory’ based on intuitionistic logic, and if you define truth at a as truth at
every w ∈ a then you can prove that ∨ satisfies [∨]. Notice that it does not
follow from [A] that a α ∨ β gives either a α or a β. This means that
you cannot get [∨] by imposing closure conditions on allowable indices, which
is the way intuitionistic logic is obtained in the present paper. You may be
able to obtain intuitionistic logic by imposing conditions on truth sets, such as
the condition [EP] described in the text, but as I mentioned in the text, the
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closure conditions of the present paper apply to indices not truth sets. This
is in line with my claim to present intuitionistic logic as a matter of how the
world presents itself rather than how our language characterises it.
An extended tractarian (general) frame for some fixed language of first-order
predicate logic is a quadruple 〈W,P,D,Q〉 in whichW is a set of ‘worlds’, P a
non-empty subset of ℘W − ∅ and D a set of ‘individuals’. For every w ∈ W,
Q(w) ⊆ D is the set of things which ‘exist’ in w. It is required that ⋂{Q(w) :
w ∈ W} 6= ∅. If we define Da for a ∈ P as
⋂
{Q(w) : w ∈ a} then since⋂
{Q(w) : w ∈ W} 6= ∅, Da will be non-empty, and if a ⊆ b then Db ⊆
Da. For a world w ∈ W, Dw = Q(w). A model, 〈W,P,D,Q, V〉 based on
〈W,P,D,Q〉 adds a function V , where V(ϕ), for n-place ϕ, is a set of n + 1-
tuples of the form 〈u1, . . . , un, w〉 for u1, . . . , un ∈ D and w ∈ W. In such a
model an assignment µ to the variables is a function such that, for each variable
x, µ(x) ∈ D. Every wff can be given a truth value at an index with respect
to an assignment µ. Where µ and ρ both assign members of the domain D
of individuals to the variables I call them x-alternatives iff they agree on all
variables except (possibly) x. Where µ is any assignment of members of D to
the individual variables then
[ϕ] aµ ϕx1 · · · xn iff 〈µ(x1), . . . , µ(xn), w〉 ∈ V(ϕ) for every w ∈ a.
The rules for ∼, ∧, ⊃ and ∨ are [¬], [∧], [⊃] and [∨∪] (for  wff ) relativised
to an assignment µ. If the indices were worlds the semantic rule for ∀ would
be
[∀w] wµ ∀xα iff for every x-alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈ Q(w), wρ α.
For a propositional index a, ∀must be understood to range over the entities in
any world in a. This dictates the following, for a, b ∈ P:
[∀] aµ ∀xα iff for every b ⊆ a, and every x-alternative ρ of µ such that
ρ(x) ∈ Db, bρ α.
T 5 If 〈W,P〉 is full then ∀ is classically respectable.
P Suppose that aµ ∀xα and w ∈ a. Then {w} ⊆ a, and so, by [∀], for
every x-alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈ Dw, {w}ρ α. So, by [∀], {w}µ ∀xα.
Suppose aµ ∀xα. Then for some b ⊆ a there is some x-alternative ρ of µ such
that ρ(x) ∈ Db and bρ α. So by [A] there is some w ∈ b such that {w}ρ α.
But Db ⊆ Dw and so ρ(x) ∈ Dw, and so {w}µ ∀xα. ]
The problem case is, predictably, the existential quantifier. If we take the ‘clas-
sical’ rule we have:
[∃] aµ ∃xα iff there is some x-alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈ Da and
aρ α.
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But an operator defined by [∃] is not respectable. For let 〈W,P〉 be the full
frame in which W = {w1, w2}, and let 〈W,P,D,Q, V〉 be the model based
on 〈W,P〉 in which D = {u1, u2}, Q(w) = D for all w ∈ W and V(ϕ) =
{〈u1, w1〉, 〈u2, w2〉}. Let a = W. Then {w1}µ ∃xϕx and {w2}µ ∃xϕx. But
where µ(x) = u1 and ρ(x) = u2 these are the only two assignments for x; and

aµ ϕx since 〈u1, w2〉 6∈ V(ϕ) and aρ ϕx since 〈u2, w1〉 6∈ V(ϕ), and so by
[∃], aµ ∃xϕx even though {w}µ ∃xϕx for everyw ∈ a. The rule for ∃ which
corresponds to [∨∪] is:
[∃∗] aµ ∃xα iff there is a family C ⊆ P such that a ⊆
⋃
C ∈ P and, for every
b ∈ C there is some x-alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈ Db and bρ α.
Note that Theorem 2 still holds for all of [∀], [∃] and [∃∗].
T 6 If 〈W,P〉 is full and [∃∗] is used then ∃ is respectable.
P Suppose that aµ ∃xα. Then there is a family C ⊆ P such that
a ⊆ ⋃C ∈ P and, for every b ∈ C there is some x-alternative ρ of µ such
that ρ(x) ∈ Db and bρ α. Suppose w ∈ a. Then w ∈
⋃
C and so, for some
b ∈ C, w ∈ b. So, by [A], {w}ρ α. Now Db ⊆ Dw and so ρ(x) ∈ Dw and so
{w}µ ∃xα. Suppose {w}µ ∃xα for every w ∈ a. Then {w}ρ α for some x-
alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈ Dw. Let C = {{w} : w ∈ a}. Then a ⊆
⋃
C
and for every b ∈ C there is some x-alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈ Db and
bρ α. So, by [∃∗], aµ ∃xα. ]
A wff α is valid on an extended tractarian frame 〈W,P,D,Q〉 iff α is valid in
every model 〈W,P,D,Q, V〉 based on 〈W,P,D,Q〉, i. e, iff aµ α for every
a ∈ P and every µ such that µ(x) ∈ Da for every x free in α. A frame (model)
is said to be a frame for (model for) a set X of wff iff every α ∈ X is valid on that
frame (model). Theorems 5 and 6 guarantee the link with classical logic. A
(classical) interpretation for  is a pair 〈D,V〉 where D is a non-empty class,
and V is a function such that where ϕ is an n-place predicate then V(ϕ) is a
class of n-tuples from D. Truth is defined with respect to an assignment µ to
the variables in the following way:
• Vµ(ϕx1 . . . xn) = 1 if 〈µ(x1), . . . , µ(xn)〉 ∈ V(ϕ) and 0 otherwise.
• Vµ(α∧ β) = 1 if Vµ(α) = 1 and Vµ(β) = 1 and 0 otherwise.
• Vµ(∼α) = 1 if Vµ(α) = 0 and 0 otherwise.
• Vµ(α∨ β) = 1 if Vµ(α) = 1 or Vµ(β) = 1 and 0 otherwise.
• Vµ(α ⊃ β) = 1 if either Vµ(α) = 0 or Vµ(β) = 1 and 0 otherwise.
• Vµ(∀xα) = 1 if Vρ(α) = 1 for every x-alternative ρ of µ, and 0 otherwise.
• Vµ(∃xα) = 1 if there is an x-alternative ρ of µ such that Vρ(α) = 1, and
0 otherwise.
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A wff α is valid in a classical interpretation 〈D,V〉 iff Vµ(α) = 1 for every
assignment µ. A wff α is a classical consequence of a set X of wff iff α is valid in
every classical interpretation in which every member of X is valid.
Suppose that 〈W,P〉 is a full tractarian frame and that 〈W,P,D,Q, V〉 is
any tractarian model based on 〈W,P〉. For any w ∈ W, let 〈Q(w), Vw〉 be the
classical interpretation in which 〈u1, . . . , un〉 ∈ Vw(ϕ) iff 〈u1, . . . , un, w〉 ∈
V(ϕ). An obvious induction on the construction of α establishes, for every
assignment µ where µ(x) ∈ Q(w) for every x free in α,
T 7 Vwµ (α) = 1 iff {w}µ α.
Conversely, suppose that 〈D,V〉 is a classical interpretation and let w be some
arbitrary object and let Q(w) = D, and let 〈W,P,D,Q, V∗〉 be the (full) trac-
tarian model in which W = {w}, P = {{w}}, and for u1, . . . , un ∈ D, we have
〈u1, . . . , un, w〉 ∈ V∗(ϕ) iff 〈u1, . . . , un〉 ∈ V(ϕ). Then, also by induction:
T 8 Vµ(α) = 1 iff {w}µ α.
Where X is any set of wff say that X T+ α iff α is valid in every full tractarian
model for X.
T 9 X T+ α iff α is a classical consequence of X.
P Suppose that X T+ α. Then it follows that there is a full tractarian
model 〈W,P,D,Q, V〉 in which every β ∈ X is valid but aµ α for some a ∈ P
and some assignment µ such that µ(x) ∈ Da for every x free in α. Since 〈W,P〉
is full all the operators are respectable, and so, by [A], for somew ∈ a, {w}µ α,
and since µ(x) ∈ Da and {w} ⊆ a then µ(x) ∈ Q(w) (= D{w}). Since every
β ∈ X is valid in 〈W,P,D,Q, V〉 then {w}ρ β for every β ∈ X and every ρ
such that ρ(x) ∈ Q(w) for every x free in β. So, by Theorem 7, Vwµ (α) = 0
and Vwρ (β) = 1, for every β ∈ X and every assignment ρ such that ρ(x) ∈
Q(w) for every x free in β. But then α is not a classical consequence of X.
Conversely, suppose that α is not a classical consequence of X. Then there is a
classical interpretation 〈D,V〉 in which Vµ(α) = 0 for some assignment µ, and
Vρ(β) = 1 for every β ∈ X and every assignment ρ. Where 〈W,P,D,Q, V∗〉 is
defined as in Theorem 8, {w}µ α where µ(x) ∈ Dw for every x free in α, and
{w}ρ β for every β ∈ X and every ρ such that ρ(x) ∈ Dw for every x free in
β, and so α fails in a full tractarian model for X, and so X T+ α. ]
To obtain intuitionistic logic we require
⋃
-closed frames. The next theorem
shews that [∃] and [∃∗] are equivalent in a ⋃-closed tractarian frame.
T 10 If 〈W,P〉 is ⋃-closed and [∃∗] is used then aµ ∃xα iff there is
some x-alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈ Da and aρ α.
P Suppose [∃∗] is used and aµ ∃xα. Then there is a family C ⊆ P
such that a ⊆ ⋃C ∈ P and, for every b ∈ C there is some x-alternative ρ of
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µ such that ρ(x) ∈ Db and bρ α. Since 〈W,P〉 is
⋃
-closed then
⋃
C ∈ C
and so there is some x-alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈ D⋃C and ⋃Cρ α.
But a ⊆ ⋃C and so D⋃C ⊆ Da. So ρ(x) ∈ Da and, by Theorem 2, aρ α.
If aρ α for some x-alternative ρ of µ let C = {a}. Then
⋃
C = a and so
a ⊆ ⋃C, and for every b ∈ C, bρ α. So aµ ∃xα. ]
A Kripke model for intuitionistic predicate logic is a quintuple 〈I, R,D,Q, V〉
in which I is a set of ‘indices’, R a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetrical re-
lation on I, D another set, and Q a function such that for i ∈ I, Q(i) ⊆ D
and if iRj then Q(i) ⊆ Q(j).17 V is a function such that, where ϕ is an n-
place predicate, V(ϕ) is a set of n + 1-tuples each of the form 〈u1, . . . , un, i〉
for u1, . . . , un ∈ D and i ∈ I, where, if 〈u1, . . . , un, i〉 ∈ V(ϕ) and iRj then
〈u1, . . . , un, j〉 ∈ V(ϕ). For atomic wffϕx1 · · · xn we haveVµ(ϕx1 · · · xn, i) =
1 if 〈µ(x1), . . . , µ(xn), i〉 ∈ V(ϕ) and 0 otherwise. The propositional operat-
ors work as before, though relativised to an assignment µ. The quantifiers are
evaluated as
[∀I] Vµ(∀xα, i) = 1 if Vρ(α, j) = 1 for every j such that iRj, and every x-
alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈ Q(j) and 0 otherwise.18
[∃I] Vµ(∃xα, i) = 1 if Vρ(α, i) = 1 for at least one x-alternative ρ of µ such
that ρ(x) ∈ Q(i) and 0 otherwise.
A wff is valid in a model 〈I, R,D,Q, V〉 iff for every index i ∈ I, Vµ(α, i) = 1
for every assignment µ such that µ(x) ∈ Q(i) for every variable x. I shall
call 〈I, R,D,Q〉 an extended Kripke frame; and validity on a frame will mean
validity in every model based on that frame.
I now shew that restricting tractarian frames to those which are
⋃
-closed
gets intuitionistic logic. Let 〈I, R〉 be an intuitionistic frame. For i ∈ I let
i+ = {j : iRj}. Then iRj iff j+ ⊆ i+. Let 〈I, PI〉 be the tractarian frame
obtained from 〈I, R〉 by letting a ∈ PI iff a = i+ for some i ∈ I.
T 11 If C ⊆ PI and ⋃C ∈ PI then ⋃C ∈ C.
P First note that if C ⊆ PI and a ∈ C then a = i+ for some i ∈ I
(call it ia); and, in particular, if
⋃
C ∈ PI then ⋃C = i+∗ for some i∗ ∈ I. (I. e.
17See Kripke 1965. (The semantic rules for the quantifiers are on p. 96.) For the antisymmetry
condition see the comment on Theorem 2 above.
18It might be instructive to consider what would happen if the following rule were used for ∀:
[∀ ′] Vµ(∀xα, i) = 1 if Vρ(α, i) = 1 for every x-alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈Q(i) and 0
otherwise.
By [∀ ′], given Theorem 2, ∀xαwould be true at i iff at every j such that iRj, α is true of everything
which exists in i. The difference between ∀ according to [∀I] and according to [∀ ′] mimics the
difference in ordinary modal logic between 2∀xα and ∀x2α, except that in modal logic the
difference can be expressed syntactically. In tractarian models [∀ ′] would be what you get if [∀]
were to read:
aµ ∀xα iff for every x-alternative ρ of µ such that ρ(x) ∈ Da, aρ α.
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i∗ = i⋃C.) Now, for any j ∈ I, j ∈ i+∗ iff for some a ∈ C, j ∈ a. So in particular
i∗ ∈ i+∗ iff for some a ∈ C, i∗ ∈ a. But i∗ ∈ i+∗ and so i∗ ∈ a; i. e., iaRi∗.
But ia ∈
⋃
C, i. e ia ∈ i+∗ , and so i∗Ria. So, by antisymmetry i∗ = ia and so
i+∗ = a, for some a ∈ C. So
⋃
C ∈ C.19 ]
Let 〈I, R〉 be an intuitionistic frame generated by an index i*, and then let
〈I, R,D,Q, V〉 be an intuitionistic model based on 〈I, R〉. Consider the corres-
ponding tractarian model 〈I, PI, D,Q, V〉, based on 〈I, PI〉. Note that Q(i) =
Di+ as Di+ is defined for tractarian models, since u ∈ Di+ iff u ∈ Q(j) for
every j ∈ i+, i. e. every j such that iRj; and given that Q(i) ⊆ Q(j) this will
hold iff u ∈ Q(i). Furthermore, ⋂{Q(i) : i ∈ I} = Q(i∗), and it follows that⋂
{Q(i) : i ∈ I} 6= ∅.
T 12 i+µ α iff Vµ(α, i) = 1.
P Suppose i+µ ϕx1 . . . xn. Then 〈µ(x1), . . . , µ(xn), j〉 ∈ V(ϕ) for
all j ∈ i+, i. e., for all j such that iRj. In particular, 〈µ(x1), . . . , µ(xn), i〉 ∈
V(ϕ), and so Vµ(ϕx1 . . . xn, i) = 1. Suppose Vµ(ϕx1 . . . xn, i) = 1. Then
〈µ(x1), . . . , µ(xn), j〉 ∈ V(ϕ) for all j such that iRj, i. e., for all j ∈ i+. So i+µ
ϕx1 . . . xn. The rules for ∼, ∧, ⊃ and ∀ are exactly parallel for intuitionistic
models and tractarian models and so the induction will go through. This can
be illustrated in the case of ¬: If i+µ ∼α then

bµ α for every b ∈ P such
that b ⊆ i+. Since b ∈ P, b = j+ for some j ∈ I, and j+µ α. So, by the
induction hypothesis, Vµ(α, j) = 0. Since j+ ⊆ i+, iRj; and so Vµ(α, j) = 0
for every j such that iRj, and so Vµ(∼α, i) = 1. If

i+µ ∼α then there is some
j+ ⊆ i+ such that j+µ α; and so Vµ(α, j) = 1 and iRj. So Vµ(∼α, i) = 0. The
induction for ∨ and ∃ is exactly parallel if [∨] and [∃] are used in the tractarian
model. But by Theorem 11, the model is
⋃
-closed and so, by Theorems 4 and
10, the result is the same if [∨∪] and [∃∗] are used. ]
For the other direction, where 〈W,P,D,Q, V〉 is a tractarian model and 〈W,P〉
is
⋃
-closed, and R is the converse of ⊆, and for a ∈ P, Q∗(a) = ⋂{Q(w) :
w ∈ a}, then 〈P, R,D,Q∗, V〉 is an intuitionistic model for which the following
holds for every wff α and every a ∈ P:
T 13 aµ α iff Vµ(α, a) = 1.
P The proof, given that 〈W,P〉 is ⋃-closed, is, as for Theorem 12, by
induction on the construction of α. ]
19PI sets are
⋃
-closed and therefore ∪∗ closed in the sense of footnote 13 which speaks of
allowable unions of indices. It is also instructive to consider their intersection. Suppose that
i+ ∩ j+ is non−empty. Then there is some k such that k ∈ i+ ∩ j+. But then iRk and jRk.
So if i+ ∩ j+ is non-empty there is some k such that iRk and jRk. The condition that any
two indices can see a common index marks off the extension of intuitionistic logic obtained by
adding ∼p ∨ ∼∼p. (See Dummett and Lemmon 1959, p. 252.) In a finite frame the condition
entails that there is a ‘bottom’ index — a k∗ ∈ I such that iRk∗ for all i ∈ I. Further [∼] entails
that in any frame with a bottom index k∗, for any i ∈ I and any wff α, V(∼α, i) = V(∼α, k∗).
What this means is that in any finite frame, on the assumption that every pair of allowable
propositions has a non-empty intersection, every negated wff behaves completely classically.
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It is an immediate consequence of Theorems 12 and 13 that a wff fails in an
intuitionistic model iff it fails in a
⋃
-closed tractarian model. This shews that
the class of wff valid in intuitionistic logic is just the class of wff valid on
⋃
-
closed extended tractarian frames. Further, Theorems 12 and 13 guarantee the
equivalence of ‘tractarian’ logic and intuitionistic logic in the following strong
sense:
T 14 Where X is any set of wff of , and α is any wff and X T∪ α
means that α is valid in every
⋃
-closed tractarian model for X, and X I α
means that α is valid in every Kripke model for X, then X T∪ α iff X I α
I am not able to claim that this semantics is superior to the many that are
already on offer for intuitionistic logic, but insofar as it seems a little different,
and has some philosophical motivation, it is perhaps worthy of consideration.
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